Insights · Cybersecurity
Passkeys: A Practical Guide Based on FIDO and NIST
In our NIST article we saw that the new guidance treats passwords alone as not phishing-resistant, however long they are. The practical question now: what is the alternative? The answer backed by the FIDO Alliance and recognised by NIST is passkeys. This guide explains what they are, why they resist phishing, their real limits, and how to start.
Last updated: October 2026 · based on the FIDO Alliance passkeys page and the NIST SP 800-63B-4 appendix on syncable authenticators
What is a passkey?
The FIDO Alliance describes a passkey as "an authentication credential based on FIDO standards." It can be stored on a phone, a computer, or a hardware security key, and it is tied to your account on a website or app, so you no longer need a username and password.
- A key pair instead of a shared secret: passkeys "replace passwords with cryptographic key pairs." The site stores only the public key, so there is no shared secret to steal from its servers.
- Signing in by unlocking your device: you approve with the same method you use to unlock your device (biometrics, a PIN, or a pattern). FIDO states that biometric data stays on the device and is never sent to a remote server.
Why do they resist phishing?
FIDO says phishing resistance is "a core design goal," and that credentials are unique to each site. In practice, a fake login page has nothing reusable to capture, unlike a password, which can be typed into a fake page. This is exactly what NIST means when it says passwords alone are not phishing-resistant.
Synced or tied to one device?
FIDO describes two kinds: passkeys that sync across your devices with end-to-end encryption, and device-bound passkeys (such as hardware security keys) that never leave their device.
| Type | Advantage | Limit |
|---|---|---|
| Synced passkey | Easy to use and available on all your devices | Stored in a cloud "sync fabric"; its safety depends on the safety of your cloud account and how it is recovered |
| Device-bound key | Highest control; not exported | Losing the device requires a backup way to sign in |
The real limits: what NIST says
NIST devotes a whole appendix to syncable authenticators and is explicit:
- Suitable for AAL2, not AAL3: they may support AAL2 under the guidance's requirements, but they do not meet AAL3 because syncing "violates the non-exportability requirements" of that level.
- Recovery is the weak link: synced keys "are accessible via cloud-based account recovery processes," which NIST identifies as a weakness. Mitigations it lists include binding multiple authenticators, requiring AAL2 to add a new one, and notifying users of recovery activity.
- Sharing risk: some implementations let keys move to other users' devices, so for public-facing services NIST says to assume any syncable authenticator "may be subject to sharing."
- Compromise of the sync service: if the cloud is breached, keys are exposed; mitigations include storing only encrypted material and using a secret the sync provider does not know.
How to start in practice
- Start with priority accounts: your main email first, then your bank, then social media. Email is the recovery key for your other accounts.
- In each service's security settings, look for "Passkeys." Not every service supports them yet.
- Secure the sync account itself (Google, Apple or Microsoft): a long unique password and an up-to-date recovery method that only you know.
- Add a backup way in instead of relying on one device: a second device or a hardware security key, since NIST lists binding multiple authenticators as a mitigation.
- Keep a strong password and two-factor authentication for services that do not support passkeys yet.
- Never share a passkey, and never agree to add it on a device you do not recognise.
